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Abstract
Vulnerability identification, remediation, and compliance verification within the Department of
Defense (DOD) are currently inconsistent and non-integrated. The Secure Configuration Tool
Suite (SCTS) solution should make significant grounds in resolving the DOD deficiency within
an Enterprise-wide Information Assurance Vulnerability Management System.
The professional project documented in this paper is a result of a major DOD initiative in support
of the SCTS, and is comprised of 2 initiatives: the Secure Configuration Compliance Validation
Initiative (SCCVI), which provides vulnerability assessment capability, and the Secure
Configuration Remediation Initiative (SCRI), which provides vulnerability remediation
capability.

As a member of the project installation team the author performed on-site

installations as required and directed.
The DOD is a large organization and documenting the entire project would be beyond the scope
of this professional project. Therefore, this analysis is based on a smaller scale of the initiative
above. The installation of an unclassified baseline model at a pre-selected DOD command and
all of its subcomponents will be utilized for this thesis. This installation will eventually be
available for all DOD components to use as a lessons-learned tool and as a result these tools will
be applied across the DOD Enterprise and should fully integrate IA Vulnerability identification,
verification, and reporting; thus making a significant contribution to an Enterprise-wide
Information Assurance Vulnerability Management System.
While this project is based on actual events and efforts, in order to keep within the guidelines of
non-disclosure outside of the DOD environment, specific names of commands, agencies and
locations have been substituted with generic ones.
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Executive Summary
Vulnerability identification, remediation, and compliance verification within Department of
Defense (DOD) are currently inconsistent and non-integrated. The requirement to resolve this
deficiency was identified by the DOD Enterprise-wide Information Assurance and Computer
Network Defense (IA/CND) Solutions Steering Group (ESSG) chaired by a major strategic
command. My agency, at the request of this command and in support of National Security goals,
purchased from industry; a capability that will assist in the development and deployment of an
automated tool that will provide network administrators and security personnel a mechanism for
the remediation of vulnerabilities based on DOD instructions. This tool suite, consisting of the
Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative (SCCVI) tool and the Secure
Configuration Remediation Initiative (SCRI) tool, will be the “Enterprise-wide” solution known
as the Secure Configuration Tool Suite (SCTS) across the DOD (Combatant Commands,
Intelligence Community (non-Title 50 elements), Services, and DOD Agencies), Coast Guard,
National Guard, and the Reserves, hereafter referred to as the “Enterprise.” This project covers
the installation of these tools at a major Combatant Command and its Sub-Components in an
effort to establish a baseline and concept of operations for all subsequent installations to follow.
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Chapter One
Introduction
In addition to the traditional Information Assurance (IA) capabilities provided by my employer,
we are also supporting a major Department of Defense (DOD) Combatant Command’s initiative
developed and approved by the Enterprise Solutions Steering Group (ESSG) of my organization
by providing DOD level enterprise-wide solutions for IA.
My employer is the deploying arm for these efforts and we will provide installation support for
the Secure Configuration Tool Suite (SCTS) Initiative. SCTS is the DOD enterprise-wide
solution for vulnerability assessment and vulnerability remediation and is comprised of two
initiatives.
The Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative (SCCVI) provides vulnerability
assessment capability and the Secure Configuration Remediation Initiative (SCRI) provides
vulnerability remediation capability. These products were purchased from Citadel Security
Software, Inc. and eEye Digital Security.
These tools will be applied Enterprise-wide across the DOD, Coast Guard, National Guard, and
the Reserves. This capability should fully integrate IA Vulnerability identification, verification,
and reporting.
This project is an effort to install the SCTS at a major combatant command to be utilized as the
baseline for future installations at other DOD components.

IA Enterprise Tools Overview
The Secure Configuration Tool Suite (SCTS) is a DOD enterprise-wide solution for vulnerability
assessment and vulnerability remediation and is comprised of two initiatives. These initiatives
are the Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative (SCCVI), which provides
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vulnerability assessment capability, and the Secure Configuration Remediation Initiative (SCRI)
that provides vulnerability remediation capability. Below is an overview of the SCCVI and
SCRI initiatives and the capabilities of each tool.

Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative (SCCVI)
SCCVI is comprised of eEye Digital Security’s Retina Network Security Scanner and its Remote
Enterprise Management (REM) console. The SCCVI tool is instrumental in downloading
Information Assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM) information, conducting scans to
identify network assets impacted by the vulnerability, passing information to the Secure
Configuration Remediation Initiative (SCRI) tool regarding impacted network assets, conducting
vulnerability mitigation scans, and reporting IAVM compliance status to the DOD Information
Assurance Vulnerability Management System (VMS) database.
The scanner can conduct two types of scans. For systems supported by the capability and for
which it has administrative permissions, the SCCVI tool conducts an internal scan of the
system’s configuration and registry files. SCCVI supports most hardware systems, all operating
systems and the majority of common software applications. For systems that the tool has not
been provided administrative rights or the occasional software application not supported by
SCCVI, the scanner will conduct an external ‘ping’ scan of the system. By scanning, SCCVI
discovers assets and identifies known security vulnerabilities on various network platforms and
technologies including servers, databases, switches, routers, and wireless access points.
The Remote Enterprise Manager (REM) allows multiple scanners to be managed from one
centralized location. It also provides the ability for scanners to report their findings to one
centralized location. Reports can be generated based on data collected from all of the scanners
reporting to the REM.
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Secure Configuration Remediation Initiative (SCRI)
SCRI is comprised of Citadel Hercules technology. The SCRI tool imports information from the
SCCVI tool (scanners) regarding impacted network assets and conducts remediation operations
(i.e. software patch installations) to address the vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability remediation involves implementation of corrective actions to eliminate or mitigate
identified vulnerabilities. Remediation actions may include implementation of a new or revised
policy such as a firewall configuration change, frequent password change, type/character/length
of password, as well as the installation of “patch” code to address vulnerability via software
changes. Patch installation can be a time consuming, knowledge-intensive task and the use of
automated methods to conduct patch installations greatly reduces the level of effort required to
correct a given vulnerability.
The SCRI tool leverages the scanned data provided by SCCVI to apply patches, upgrades, fixes,
or custom changes to a specific system or group of systems impacted by IAVM information to
facilitate the automatic vulnerability remediation of devices on a network. The SCRI tool
provides a sequence of automatically executable remediation steps known as ‘remedies’ that will
correct each recognized vulnerability. Users of the product will download new patches from the
government assigned website. The SCRI tool provides System Administrators with the ability to
manage a large-scale vulnerability remediation process in a manner that is both systematic and
comprehensive.
The principle components of the SCRI suite include the SCRI server, file download server, SCRI
administrator, and SCRI clients. In addition to SCRI components, the system requires the
Window 2000 Operating System and Microsoft IIS Web Server for reporting via remote server
access.
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Hypothesis
Vulnerability identification, remediation and compliance verification within DOD are currently
inconsistent and non-integrated. The Secure Configuration Tool Suite solution should make
significant grounds in resolving the Department of Defense deficiency with an Enterprise-Wide
Information Assurance Vulnerability Management System.

Purpose of Research
The purpose of this document is to provide a plan for seamless deployment and integration of the
SCTS tools by my employer into an organization’s architecture. The deployment process is
intended for installation of the tools whether they are implemented individually or as a package.
The deployment process is intended to be a framework that can be modified as necessary for the
specifics of a particular site.
The site selected is a major Combatant Command that is leading the way for the development of
the proof of concept and eventually providing the baseline for concepts of operations as it relates
to SCTS for all DOD to follow.
The project has five deployment phases: Initiation, Site Survey, Installation, Post-Installation and
Sustainment. For each phase, entry and exit criteria were established. A description of each step
is provided in Chapter Three.
Once the suite is installed the command which received the installation will provide the
necessary feedback to make improvements of use and sustainment of these tools.
Specifically, the objectives of this feedback are:
•

To provide an operational approach for the employment of SCCVI to facilitate asset
identification, vulnerability assessment, and compliance reporting,
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•

To provide an operational approach for the employment of SCRI tools to expedite
patch installation that addresses a software vulnerability,

•

To provide an approach to obtain applicable service component and centrally
managed program assets’ vulnerability compliance status,

•

To describe aspects of employment, training, and life cycle management associated
with Secure Configuration Tool Suite employment in support of Information
Assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM) Program objectives.

Limitations / Scope
This project had a few limitations these limitations are as follows:
•

Product selection for the initiatives were done prior to project being develop

•

Security restrictions limit the amount of information that may be published in this
paper

•

The scope of the project was to evaluate the deployment process and not evaluate the
products

•

Unable to verify the software methodology process for development

Definition of Terms
Please see appendix D for a list of acronyms and the glossary for definition of terms at the end of
this document.

Summary
This chapter provides the background information necessary to understand the importance of the
project and its purpose. An overview is given of the two initiatives contained in the Secure
Configuration Tool Suite (SCTS) and what tools were utilized. A hypothesis is stated and a
description of the projects limitation is also provided.
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Chapter Two
Overview
Significant research was conducted prior to beginning this project. For the most part, the
vendors provided most of the documentation needed for the technical side of the project. In
addition, there were several DOD documents that were utilized as tasking orders provided by
higher authority and used as guidelines for the installation. These documents are not available
for public review, but the vendor’s installation manuals, users manual, and operation manual
have been identified in this document. If one has access to a .mil network, they will be able to
review all the governing documents that were used in support of this project.
In an effort to broaden the author’s mind to other possible solutions the DOD might have used,
research was conducted on the Internet to evaluate other products. The evaluation was done
based on the research material reviewed and not on actual hands on approach.

Literature Review
As for DOD’s product selection for this project, curiosity struck the author as to whether there
were better products out there that might have been utilized. From the vulnerability scanning
perspective there are many to choose from. This author, on three other products, conducted a
literary review in an effort to see if there were better products that DOD could have chosen from.
The three products chosen for the author’s review where ISS, NetRecon, and Nessus.
•

ISS Internet Scanner is an application-level vulnerability assessment that started off in '92
as a tiny Open Source scanner by Christopher Klaus. Now ISS has grown into a billiondollar company. ISS Internet Scanner is pretty good, but is not cheap.
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•

Symantec NetRecon helps secure an organization¹s networks by exposing vulnerabilities
before intruders can exploit and attack them. By automatically scanning systems and
services on the network and safely simulating common intrusion or attack scenarios.

•

Nessus, formerly an open source vulnerability assessment tool, is a remote security
scanner for Linux, BSD, Solaris, and other Unices. It is plug-in-based, has a GTK
interface, and performs over 1200 remote security checks. It allows for reports to be
generated in HTML, XML, LaTeX, and ASCII text, and suggests solutions for security
problems. It turned proprietary in late 2005

A March 2003 Information Security magazine review of five vulnerability assessment tools
(including the ones I reviewed) was conducted and their final evaluation was similar to mind.
Without micro- analyzing each product, which would be outside of the realm of this project, I
believe it is safe to quote Mr. Snyder as saying, “None of the products we looked at excelled in
all areas. Almost any might be good for a once-a-year scan of your network. But as day-to-day
tools in the real world of corporate security, each had significant weaknesses.” (Snyder) Snyder
personally did not find one better than the other, the only issue he mentioned that supported the
selection of Retina by DOD was that eEye Digital Security’s Retina is a newer product that is
still maturing, but it is one of the most promising of the products he reviewed.
It is for this reason that this author believes DOD chose Retina over all others. Of course, cost
probably had a lot to do with it, but their flexibility to meet DOD needs and make the necessary
addition could have been the primary reason for the product selection.
In addition, when you add the REM Security Management Platform, it enables network security
managers to:
•

Create an inventory of all assets
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•

Audit the assets and evaluate results of the audit

•

Delegate tasks and, if necessary, remediate against vulnerabilities

•

Generate Reports

•

Perform a risk analysis

“With the REM Security Management Platform, network security personnel are able to plan,
audit, assign tasks, remediate, and generate reports from a centralized location.” (eEye REM
Operation Guide 1)
Most organizations this author worked for have some form of scanning devices or software for
their network. They have some process in place to scan for known network vulnerabilities
automatically. However, that is where the automation ends. Once vulnerability is discovered it
is normally turned over to the security manager so he/she may prioritize the vulnerabilities for
the security administrators. This is normally done to provide some form of protection against
installing possible patches that may bring down the network, but it also means your network is
vulnerable to the threats discovered until the network is patched.
In an interview that this author read on the Internet by IT Business Edge’s Security Strategies
section, they spoke with Dave Ostrowski, Product Marketing Manager, for Internet Security
Systems Inc. (ISS) in Atlanta, and Scott Johnson, the company’s product manager. In this
interview Mr. Johnson put it best when it pertains to automated remediation when he said, “Not
every customer wants to apply automatic updates, because frankly they’re scared. If you just
automatically apply something and it goes wrong, you’ve just applied that to your whole
network.” (Schwartz) I believe this holds true anywhere you go.
However there are a growing number of products out there that claim to do automated
remediation in some form or shape. For example,
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Secure Elements Inc announced that its CLASS 5 Automated Vulnerability Remediation
(AVR) product is a complete vulnerability management solution that enables IT security
departments to proactively stop attacks before they start. The solution centralizes all
aspects of vulnerability management, enabling users to automatically protect assets from
most types of exploits, and to quickly locate, lock down and protect assets that have
known vulnerabilities or that has rogue processes, unauthorized applications or invalid
users on board. The CLASS 5 AVR standard modules include asset inventory and
control, policy and audit management, active compliance and enforcement and
vulnerability assessment and remediation. (Thomas)
Microsoft also has their version of patch management, which is known as Software Update
Services, (SUS), or what is going to be used WSUS after 2006. This product “provides dynamic
notification of critical updates to Windows computers as well as automatic distribution of those
updates to your corporate Windows desktops and servers. For Software Update Services to
function, only one corporate intranet computer requires access to the public Internet.”
(Microsoft)
Finally, the last product this author reviewed is called, Altiris. The reason this author reviewed
this product was because the agency this author currently works for actually deployed the
product on their own network. Altiris provided everything that Hercules does.
•

Asset Monitoring

•

Client & Mobile

•

Security & Compliance

•

Server & Infrastructure
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Unfortunately even though the product claims to work on a UNIX environment, most of the
UNIX administrators at my organization state that it does not work very well, mainly because
Altirus states, “There may not be proper execution of our installation scripts in the cases where
shell aliases are used.” Most of the tactical machines used in a DOD environment are configured
this way. While there is a work around, it is a tedious process, especially when one is dealing
with a large quantity of UNIX boxes of different flavors.
For this initiative the Hercules product was selected. “The key features of the Hercules system
include its interoperability with industry scanners and assessment tools, and a fully automated
Remediation and Policy Enforcement solution. The remedy catalog of over 19,000 tested and
proven remedies enables you to enforce security policies. The Hercules software is the only
solution that enables remediation of all five classes of vulnerabilities: Unsecured Accounts,
Unnecessary Services, Backdoors, Mis-configurations, and Software Defects.” (Hercules User
Manual)

What is Known/Unknown about the Project
The following information is known about the project:
•

The Department of Defense has mandated the use of these tools

•

The Combatant Command has been identified

•

The product selected has been tested and verified to work as advertise

•

Hardware has already been identified

•

The baseline image for each product has been developed and tested

The following information is unknown about the project:
•

What methodology was utilized for software development since these are commercial
off the shelf products
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•

Government process for selecting the products that were utilized for this project. The
author was not privy to this information

Contribution the Project will make to the Field
It is the author’s opinion that this project will contribute considerably to the development,
planning, and implementation process of any system being installed in a Department of Defense
environment. The steps used in this project, i.e. phases, and all the documentation produced will
contribute significantly to any other project that might develop at the author’s present location.

Chapter Three
Methodology
In the opinion of the author, the methodology used in this project for software development was
the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model (SEI CMM). Unfortunately, the
author was unable to verify this with the vendor. Anyone that has ever researched the SEI CMM
process knows that the tool was originally developed for the purpose of government contractors
to perform contracted software projects. While the SEI CMM has five levels of maturity it is the
author’s opinion that the three products utilized in the two initiatives that comprise SCTS, are at
a level three. Those standards that are needed to complete level two in the process have been
established and the process for fine-tuning these standards is still on going. The five maturity
levels of SEI CMM are as follows:
1. Initial
2. Repeatable
3. Defined
4. Managed

DOD’s SCTS Initiative 25
5. Optimizing
While this methodology focuses on software development, the System Development Life
Cycle (SDLC) was modified to accommodate the Department of Defense’s way of doing
business. The project was comprised of five phases: Initiation, Site Survey, Installation, PostInstallation, and Sustainment. The table below illustrates the comparison with the SDLC.

SDLC Comparison
Project
Phase 1 Initiation
Phase 2 Site Survey
Phase 3 Installation
Phase 4 Post Installation
Phase 5 Sustainment

SDLC
Planning Phase
Analysis Phase
Design Phase
Implementation Phase
Support Phase

Table 1 SDLC Comparison with Project Phases

Specific Procedures
The methodology selected worked according to plan. Specifically, for each phase, entry and exit
criteria were established. These criteria’s are discussed in the next chapter.

Initiation Phase
The Initiation phase consisted of the initial contact with the site representatives, delivery of the
implementation package, a pre-coordination meeting to walk through the Coordination Package,
and the site submission of the completed site survey form. During this phase, each site provided
sufficient information to make decisions regarding the use of the SCTS tools.

Site Survey Phase
The Site Survey phase consisted of the Site Survey meeting, hardware configuration, and
delivery and training. The purpose of this phase was to address technical aspects of the
implementation, facility readiness, the technical solution, and the schedule.
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Installation Phase
The installation phase consisted of the Kick-Off meeting, installation of hardware and software,
confirmation of the configuration, system familiarization, and the Out-Brief.

Post-Installation Phase
The Post-Installation phase consisted of final coordination of the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), documentation of the lessons learned, the start of the customer feedback cycle, and
initiation of life-cycle support.

Sustainment Phase
The Sustainment phase consisted of life-cycle support and feedback. Since this was the final
phase there really were no exit criteria. It is an ongoing phase until the end of the life cycle of
the product, which has not been determined.

Deliverables
The deliverables for this project was as follows:
•

Provide hardware and software necessary for the installation of the suite in accordance
with the System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA).

•

Install a fully functional SCTS and test that functionally based on MOA.

•

Provide over the shoulder training to qualified administrators on site.

Resource Requirements
The following resources were required for the project:
•

Installation Team

•

Hardware

•

Software plus Licenses

•

Administrative Documentation.
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•

Network Connectivity

•

The following ports need to be open based on product requirements
Retina - For scanning Windows boxes UDP ports 135, 137 and TCP ports 139
and 445 need to be open. For scanning a UNIX system, TCP port 22 should be
open.
REM – Outbound TCP Port 21690 for Retina to REM communication and TCP
Port 21692 for REM-to-REM communications.
Hercules – Outbound TCP port 80 for communications with the download server.
Hercules also needs UDP ports 135 and 137 open as well as TCP 139 and 445 to
remediate Windows boxes and TCP port 22 open to > remediate UNIX systems.

•

Trained System Administrator that has administrator rights on local network prior to
installation.

Outcome
While there were hiccups during the installation, all phases were completed as planned. All of
the findings were documented in the next chapter. The methodology used was perfect for this
project. A lot was learned that lent to future installations.

Summary
This chapter’s main focus was to provide the background of the research method used in support
of the project. It also provided a very brief comparison of the phases used in the project and how
those relate to the System Development Life Cycle. The specific procedure required to proceed
with the project was introduced and deliverables and resource requirements were identified.
Finally, the outcome of the project was stated.
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Chapter 4
Project History
This project started late September of 2005 and pretty much was completed late November 2005.
Each phase was executed according to plan and all exit criteria met with the exceptions of those
noted in this paper. Team members where assigned their install locations during Phase Two of
the project. Upon conclusion of the project all that was desired was obtained.

How the project was managed
As stated before the project was managed by strict adherence to the phases developed for
execution. Below are tables which define the entry and exit criteria of each phase.
Phase One:
Entry Criteria

Exit Criteria

Signed ATO
Tool Release Announcement to the Enterprise
Up-to-date Coordination Package

Established Communication with On-site Rep
Established Communication with Site POC
Completed Coordination Meeting
Completed Site Survey Form
Scheduled Site Survey Meeting
Table 2 Initiation Phase: Entry and Exit Criteria

Phase Two:
Entry Criteria

Exit Criteria

Established Communication with On-site Rep
Trained Staff
Established Communication with Site POC
Defined Technical Solution
Completed Coordination Meeting
Coordinated Installation Schedule Milestones
Completed Site Survey Form
Closed Critical Action Items
Scheduled Site Survey Meeting
In-Processed Hardware at Site
Table 3 Site Survey Phase: Entry and Exit Criteria

Phase Three:
Entry Criteria

Exit Criteria

Trained Staff
Installed Technical Solution
Defined Technical Solution
Completed Familiarization
Coordinated Installation Schedule Milestones Signed Property Transfer (1149)
Closed Critical Action Items
Completed Out-Brief
In-processed Hardware
Documented Status
Table 4 Installation Phase: Entry and Exit Criteria
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Phase Four:
Entry Criteria

Exit Criteria

Installed Technical Solution
Initiated Life-Cycle Support
Completed Familiarization
Quality Controlled
Signed Property Transfer
Documented Lessons Learned
Completed Out-Brief
Finalized Memorandum of Agreement
Documented Status
Table 5 Post Installation Phase: Entry and Exit Criteria

Phase Five:
Entry Criteria

Exit Criteria

Initiated Life Cycle Support
Quality Controlled
Documented Lessons Learned
Finalized Memorandum of Agreement
Table 6 Sustainment Phase: Entry and Exit Criteria

Changes to project
As the tools were installed at the sub-component sites there was a transition into what would be
defined as the implantation, which was when the site began to utilize the tools and started to
implement the processes which should have eventually ended up with the report of their asset
status being relayed up to the REM Server at the Combatant Command. Unfortunately, this did
not happen for the reasons mentioned above.
These processes should have consisted of a completed Retina scan with at a minimum the DOD
IAVA policy, against 100% of each site’s assets, followed by a remediation to the extent that the
operational sub-component would have allowed. Once the remediation was completed, there
should have been a 100% rescan of the network using the same policy and the results would have
then been reported up to the REM Server at the Combatant Command. This, of course, did not
happen either. However, if all the sub-components completed their respected network scans and
reported this to the Combatant Command’s REM Server, this would have ultimately given a
complete picture of the security posture of that Combatant Command and its sub-components.
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This was anticipated during this installation. Appendix C shows a simulation of how the SCTS
was installed at this Combatant Command and it sub-components.

Where goals meet
The Secure Configuration Tool Suite solution will make significant grounds in resolving the
DOD’s deficiency with an Enterprise-wide Information Assurance Vulnerability Management
System, the products proved themselves in the field during this project and the baseline
implementation plan was effective.
The two goals established for this project were reached,
1. Develop a plan for seamless deployment and integration to be used as the baseline for
future installations at other DoD components
2.

Develop a concept of operation for reporting within these components

However, a consensus needs to be established for the concept of operations on reporting.

Findings
It was evident to this author that a better job could have been performed in preparation of this
installment. While all steps were taken to follow each phase prior to proceeding to the next, a lot
of issues where taken for granted. Some of the technical issues discovered during the installation
were as follows:
•

Ports 21690 and 21692 were not open prior to arriving costing a delay of four
hours

•

Access to the DOD designated download server for Hercules was not
permitted from within the command

•

Site Responsibility agreements prior to installation team arrival were not
adhered to, thus delaying software installation
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•

None of the System Administrators remembered prior training

•

Command would not allow my company’s baseline scanner on their network

•

Command did not trust automated remediation

•

One sub-component command had received a damaged server, unable to
install Hercules

•

One sub-component did not even know we were coming and canceled the
installation until Phase 1 and 2 where complete at their site

•

Numerous firewall issues amongst the combatant command and its
subcomponents. Lack of communication hindered the installation

Unfortunately it was not the technical issues that presented the biggest challenges in this project.
The biggest challenges presented were the bureaucratic red tape that were addressed and ignored.
Whether a military installation or a commercial business, change is a hard thing to accept. This
project introduced changes in reporting network vulnerability status which created an
atmosphere of fear on who would see what. In addition the idea to automate the remediation
process was not accepted very well, most of the administrators where reluctant to allow an
automated product to do the patching of vulnerabilities on workstations, but most importantly on
their servers themselves.

Summary of Results
The Combatant Command that was selected had a very complex network, making it difficult to
work with both local and sub-component networks. Firewalls/routers were supposed to be open
to sub-component sites prior to the arrival of the installation teams, however they were not. Subcomponents sent the necessary waiver forms, requesting the Combatant Command’s firewalls to
be opened for their scanners, but the forms had to be resubmitted multiple times due to errors
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such as incorrect ports and IP’s. In addition, it did not help that Firewalls were going thru
scheduled maintenance, so they were up and down throughout this installation.
All this could have been avoided had the Combatant Command followed through with all
agreements made during the first three phases of this project.
It was evident to this author that all key players needed to be involved throughout the whole
process and not just entering the picture during Phase Three. The resistance to change and all the
technical issues that surfaced could have been avoided if everyone was involved from the
beginning.
From an installer’s point of view the project installation was a success. All suites were installed
at their respected site and within each site everything worked as advertised. Unfortunately, the
internal operational objectives or commitments set the project up for failure and the initial goal
of providing an Enterprise reporting and remediation tool was not achieved at the enterprise
level. At the local level administrators tested the products and while there was a reluctancy to
commit to the product it was evident to this author that there was overwhelming interest to utilize
the product once the product gained their trust.
A lot was learned from this project and have since been applied on subsequent installations.
While the Combatant Command is still working out their reporting policy with each of the subcomponents, the sub-components are using the products at their respected site. Feedback
received on issues that are relevant and benefit all have been applied based on these feedback
reports.
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Chapter 5
What was learned
So much was learned during this project. To try to document everything in the author’s opinion
is impossible. However, below is a breakdown of issues that were encountered during the
process. It has been broken into two categories: Technical and Non-Technical. One must keep
in mind that some of the technical issues are specific to DOD configuration of any system and
may not apply to a commercial entity.

Technical:
•

The Rename Script provided by my employer does not need to be run when changing
the Hercules Server IP address, only when changing the NETBIOS name.

•

Hercules will not remediate GLOBAL POLICY in an Active Directory network. It
will change LOCAL POLICY on a system, but this will not affect the entire domain.

•

Place the Hercules Server outside the domain if possible. This eliminates any
possible DOMAIN SECURITY POLICY problems such as removing user
permissions from the Hercules box.

•

Hercules client names should be less than fifteen characters.

•

When scanning an active directory network it was determined that if certain options
were enabled within the scanner, Retina will lockout accounts. The settings have been
narrowed down to: Enumerating Users via NetBIOS and the three password checks.
The only check that is enabled by default in the IAVA audit is the Enumerating Users
via NetBIOS (under options). If one is scanning an active directory network you will
want to turn these options off.
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•

Retina/REM Permission issues - IUSR accounts need the following permissions at a
minimum in order for REM to function correctly:
REM Events Manager\ -- Modify
REM Events Manager\*.xml -- Modify
REM Events Manager\*.dll -- Read
REM Events Manager\HTML\ -- Read (recursive)
REM Events Manager\HTML\Reports -- Modify (recursive)
REM Events Manager\HTML\export -- Modify (recursive)
REM Events Manager\JobQueues\ -- Modify (recursive)
REM Events Manager\Templates -- Read (recursive)
Retina5\retinaconfig.xml -- Read + Write
Retina5\Groups -- Modify (recursive)
Retina 5\Scans\Jobs\REM -- Read + Write (recursive)

Non-Technical:
•

Bring our own rack hardware toolkit (ex. Screwdriver, etc.).

•

Ensure everyone is involved in the process starting from Phase 1.

•

Contact actual administrators to get a realistic confirmation of the site survey and
validate its content.

•

Ensure a government representative from this author’s agency is present or available
on request.

What would have been done differently
From the author’s perspective the biggest thing that would be done differently for this project
occurs in Phase Four, finalizing the Memorandum of Agreement. It is the author’s belief that
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much of the political rhetoric described in this paper could have been resolved if this document
was finalized during Phase Two and established as an exit criteria for that phase.

Possible Future Work
The SCTS is gaining momentum since the end of this installation. A new version has hit the
street and testing has been completed. All future installations will be based on a 2003 platform
with XP scanners. Everything learned from this installation have been incorporated into future
installs in an effort not to repeat the same mistakes.
The initial problems presented during this project have long since been forgotten. The team and
the author continue to march forward with more installations throughout DOD. The new tasking
order that mandated the item be implemented by 2008 has done a lot for eliminating the political
rhetoric that we had to endure.
We are receiving more requests for the installations of these products daily. Since the end of this
project, this author has personally installed ten suites at ten different locations on my own, which
is not to mention what the other nine members of the team have done.
Customers are starting to learn the value of what the Secure Configuration Tool Suite has to offer
to their network as it relates to Information Assurance, bringing DOD one step closer to the
ultimate IA tool suite.

Conclusions / recommendations
A lot of preparation and man-hours where dedicated to the completion of this project. It is this
author’s opinion that the Secure Configuration Tool Suite solution will make significant grounds
in resolving the DOD’s deficiency with an Enterprise-wide Information Assurance Vulnerability
Management System.
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These products proved themselves in the field and while everything did not go exactly according
to plans, the project, in this author’s opinion, was a success. As a former Information System’s
Officer in the United States Navy, this author would have done back flips if these products were
available. The ability to scan a network for compliancy and then remediate your deficiencies at a
click of a button is worth the changes one has to make in their environment.
As more systems are deployed so does the interest in the products and the initiative. This author
looks forward to seeing this initiative go full circle.

Summary
For the last few years the Department of Defense has been advertising the Secure Configuration
Tool Suite as the tool that will assist in the resolution of vulnerability identification, remediation,
and compliance verification in a consistent and integrated manner within the Department of
Defense.
The project documented in this paper was an effort to develop a baseline for deployment to be
utilized in future installations. In addition, a proof of concept on reporting these vulnerabilities
and compliancy was also being developed. The project succeeded in both efforts in the opinion
of the author; although, some may interpret some of the writings in this paper to indicate other
wise.
This paper should be useful as a guideline for installing the two products anywhere. The
network diagram in Appendix C should give anyone an idea how these three systems interface.
The site surveys can be tailored to anyone’s needs.
The whole process, to include writing and briefing this paper has resulted in such a wealth of
knowledge that is impossible to measure. The author sincerely hopes that the readers of this
document will benefit as well.
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Appendix A – SCCVI Site Survey checklist

SCCVI Site Survey
Site Security Information
Site Location

Dates On-Site:
Assigned Tech(s)
Security Clearance POC:
Phone Number:
Fax Number:
E-mail address:

Security Clearance(s) Sent:

Yes

No

Initial Site Contact Information
POC Name:
Phone Number
Email Address:
Networking Personnel:
Phone Number
Email Address:
Operations Personnel:
Phone Number
Email Address:

System Configuration Information
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REM:
System Name
(NetBIOS):
System IP:

Documentation
MOA:
SSAA:

Checklist
Can XXX get an approved server name and IP address before install? (if yes
list information in System Configuration Information area on page 1)

Yes

No

Can you get a copy of a network diagram and any network information
beforehand?

Yes

No

Base Network Topology Diagrams – IP address space included

Yes

No

Will SCCVI equipment be interfaced with a proxy?

Yes

No

Does the network administrator have access to modify the Firewall?

Yes

No

Ports: 21690, 21692, 80 or 443 have been opened for SCCVI operation

Yes

No

What is the CCB process to get equipment on network (list on last sheet)

Yes

No

Does local policy allow for server service to be running?

Yes

No

Is Server Service currently running on all network systems? (Needed for
Retina)

Yes

No

Does local policy allow for remote registry access? (Needed for Retina)

Yes

No

Is remote registry access currently enabled on all network systems?

Yes

No

Will the Windows devices have the three default administration shares (C$,
IPC$, ADMIN$) turned on?

Yes

No
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Bandwidth limitations if any (3KB – 11 KB needed)

Yes

No

Do we have approval to connect to the network?

Yes

No

What is the network speed (10/100, Gig)?

Yes

No

Yes
S

No
R

Yes

No

Yes

No

Are there are “work time constraints” – e.g. No overtime allowed, XXX team
Yes
must report to work at certain time, or leave by certain time, etc? If so, list
below. This could impact number of days XXX team needs to complete install.

No

Rack requirements is 1U for REM; Retina is a laptop
Is space available?
Square or round holes for mounting?
Width and depth of racks? Need specs
Are shelves available if racks are incompatible
Power requirements met
Note: Systems will not be deployed with a monitor, keyboard or mouse
DAA to approve connection
Who needs to be notified for approval to install new software and hardware
onto the network?
Are the SA’s certified through DISA (either on-line or classroom) for
REM/Retina?

Shipping Information
PBO Name (Site):
PBO Telephone Number:
PBO e-mail Address:
Site Mailing Address:

Mark For (POC name):
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POC Telephone Number:
Completed Shipping Checklist:
Date Shipped:
Date of Clone used:
(to verify IAVAs/Patches/AV dates)

FedEx Tracking Number (s)

Yes

No
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Appendix B – SCRI Site Survey checklist

SCRI Site Survey
Site Security Information
Site Location

Dates On-Site:
Assigned Tech(s)
Security Clearance POC:
Phone Number:
Fax Number:
E-mail address:
Security Clearance(s) Sent:

Yes

No

Initial Site Contact Information
POC Name:
Phone Number
Email Address:
Backup POC Name:
Phone Number
Email Address:
Networking Personnel:
Phone Number
Email Address:
Operations Personnel:
Phone Number
Email Address:
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Documentation
MOA:
SSAA:
Checklist
Can XXX get a copy of a network diagram and any network information
beforehand?
Can XXX get an approved server name and IP address before install? (if yes
list information on last sheet)
Does the network administrator have access to modify the Firewall and or
local routers?
What is the CCB process to get equipment on network (list on last sheet)?
Does local policy allow for agents to be used on systems?
Does local policy allow for server service to be running?
Is Server Service currently running on all Windows network systems?
Does local policy allow for remote registry access?
Is remote registry access currently enabled on all network systems?
Can site supply a workstation for Hercules Admin console to be installed on?
(this is the management software for the Hercules server – see specs below)
Will your Unix clients have SSH 3.5p1 or greater installed?
Are there HTTP, HTTPS or FTP proxies between the Hercules server and the
Download server in Montgomery?
Will Hercules be able to utilize Windows administrator accounts that have
access to remote Windows devices that remote installation of the Hercules
client is required?
Will the Windows devices have the three default administration shares (C$,
IPC$, ADMIN$) turned on?
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Will the Windows devices allow remote registry access?
Will Hercules be allowed to create a Windows domain administration account
for remote installation and administration of the Hercules client?
Are all the sites under a single domain?
Have you reviewed the Windows client device minimum requirements and do
yours meet them?
Have you reviewed the Unix client device minimum requirements and do
yours meet them?
Is the SSH TCP/IP port 22 enabled in your network to allow remote
installation and administration of the Unix Hercules client?
Are there Windows desktop firewalls in place and if so, will it prohibit
outbound HTTP/HTTPS access by the Hercules clients?
Bandwidth limitations, if any? (explain below)
Will site be able to obtain a SSL Certificate (if needed) from DOD for
Hercules server?
Do we have approval to connect to the network?
What is the network speed (10/100, Gig)?
Rack requirements (Hercules server is 2U – Combo REM/Hercules is 3U)
Is space available?
Square or round holes for mounting?
Width and depth of racks? Need specs
Are shelves available if racks are incompatible
Power requirements met? (dual power supplies)
DAA to approve connection?
Who needs to be notified for approval to install new software and hardware
onto the network?
Are there are “work time constraints” – e.g. No overtime allowed, XXX team
Yes
must report to work at certain time, or leave by certain time, etc? If so, list
below. This could impact number of days XXX team needs to complete install.

No
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System Count and requirements
Please list the estimated amount of each type of OS that the client software will be installed on.
Windows NT 4 Workstations
Windows NT 4 Terminal Servers
Windows NT 4 Server
Windows 2000
Windows XP
Windows 2003
Sun Solaris
Red Hat Linux
IBM AIX
HP HP-UX
Apple Mac OS X

_____________
_____________
_____________
_____________
_____________
_____________
_____________
_____________
_____________
_____________
_____________

The Hercules Server must meet the following requirements (if you installing your own):
Type

Hercules Server Components

Comments

Operating
Systems

Windows® 2000 Server, SP4
Windows® 2000 Advanced Server,
SP4
Windows Server™ 2003 Standard
Edition
Windows Server™ 2003 Enterprise
Edition

• The Hercules Server can be
installed on top of an existing MSDE
or SQL Server 2000 installation.

Processor

Pentium® 4, 2 GHz or above

Memory

512 MB RAM or above

Free Disk Space

2.8 GB for server installation
5.0 GB for server upgrade

VGA Graphics

1024x768 resolution

Network Interface 100 Mb/s
Web Browser

Internet Explorer® 6.0 SP1

Web Server

IIS 5.0 (Windows® 2000 Server
family)

Software

Microsoft®.NET Framework v1.1
Microsoft® ASP.NET for Windows
Server 2003
Adobe Acrobat Reader™ 6.02 or
higher

™

• The Hercules Server cannot be
installed on a machine that is either a
Primary (PDC) or Backup Domain
Controller (BDC) or Active Directory
Controller (ADC).
• SSL is used for secure
communication.
• Software, IIS and Web Browser
must be installed prior to installing
the Hercules Server.

DOD’s SCTS Initiative 45
The following are requirements for running the Hercules Administrator Console:
Type
Operating
Systems

Hercules Administrator
Components
Windows 2000 Server, SP4
Windows 2000 Advanced Server, SP4
Windows® 2000 Professional, SP4
Windows® XP Professional, all SP
Windows Server 2003 Standard
Edition
Windows Server 2003 Enterprise
Edition

Processor

Pentium III, 750 MHz or above

Memory

256 MB RAM or above

Free Disk Space

1 GB or above

VGA Graphics

1024x768 resolution

Network Interface 100 Mb/s
Web Browser

Internet Explorer 5.5 or above

Software

Microsoft .NET Framework v1.1
Adobe Acrobat Reader 6.02 or higher

Comments
• The Hercules Administrator can run
on the same machine as the Hercules
Server, but additional disk space and
memory will be needed.

• The user of the Hercules
Administrator must be using either a
valid local Microsoft Windows
account on the Hercules Server or a
domain account recognized by the
Hercules Server.
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Hercules Windows Client Requirements:
Type

Components for Hercules Client for
Microsoft Windows

Operating
Systems

Windows 2000 Server, all Service Packs • Disk space for patch downloads
depends on size of patches, service
(SP)
Windows 2000 Advanced Server, all SP packs, and hot fixes.
Windows 2000 Professional, all SP
Windows NT® 4.0 Workstation, SP6
• For services that must be running
Windows NT® 4.0 Standard Server,
prior to installation, see Hercules
SP6
User’s Guide.
Windows NT® 4.0 Terminal Server,
SP6
Windows XP Professional, all SP
Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition
Windows Server 2003 Enterprise
Edition
Windows Server™ 2003 Small Business
Edition
Windows Server™ 2003 Web Edition

Processor

Pentium II or above

Memory

64 MB RAM or above

Free Disk Space 15 MB for client installation
5 GB for patch downloads
Web Browser

Internet Explorer 5.5 SP2 or above, only
to support Windows NT 4.0 platforms

Security

SSL used for secure communications

Comments
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Hercules Solaris Client Requirements:
Type

Solaris Components

Comments

Operating
Systems

Solaris™ 2.6, 7, 8, 9

• Hercules Client operates at run
level 3

Processor

SPARC®

• Outbound access via
HTTP/HTTPS

Memory

64 MB RAM or above

• (SSH) Inbound root access via
TCP/IP port 22

Free Disk Space

15 MB in /opt for client install and msg • Patch clusters recommended for
logging
downloads
200 MB for patch download to
• Disk space for patch download
/opt/citadel/hercules/download
depends on size of patches and
packages to download.
(Solaris 2.6 only) gzip for

Software

2. 6_Recommended. tar. Z files
Security Software • OpenSSH v3.5p1 or higher

• Install gzip and unzip in /bin or
/usr/local/bin so client can unzip
Solaris packages.

• SSL/HTTPS enabled with OpenSSL • Citadel recommends sudo access
for enhanced security.
0.96 or higher
• (Solaris 8 only) requires patch
112438-01 to enable SSL and SSH
• Sudo v1.6.7 or later (optional)

a. If you are running Solaris 2.6, and want to remediate a vulnerability that requires the
2. 6_Recommended. tar . Zfile downloaded from sunsolve. sun. com and installed on the server, you
must first have the gz ip package installed. It does not come installed by default in this older
version of Solaris. Solaris 7, 8, and 9 do not have this issue.
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Hercules Red Hat Client Requirements:
Type

Red Hat Components

Comments

Operating
Systems

Red Hat 6.0, 6.1, 6.2, 7.0, 7.1,7.2, 7.3, • Hercules Client operates at run
8, 9
level 3

Processor

Pentium II class

• Outbound access via
HTTP/HTTPS

Memory

64 MB RAM or above

• Disk space for patch downloads
depends on size of RPMs to
download.

Free Disk Space 15 MB in /opt for client install and msg
logging
200 MB for patch downloads to
/opt/citadel/hercules/down load
Software

Security
Software

Minimum RPM package versions
required:
• bzip2-0.9.5d-2.i386.rpm
• db3-3.1a
• popt-1.5-9.6x.i386.rpm
• rpm-4.0.2-6x.i386.rpm

• If these packages are not installed,
you will need to install them (in the
order listed).

• OpenSSH v3.5p1 or higher

• (SSH) Inbound root access via
TCP/IP port 22

• SSL/HTTPS enabled with
OpenSSL 0.9.6
or higher
• Sudo v1.6.7 or later (optional)

• Red Hat 7.3 should already include
the bzip and popt packages.

• Citadel recommends sudo access
for enhanced security. By default,
sudo is installed with Red Hat v8 and
v9.

a. For Red Hat 6.0 and 6.1, use db3~3.1.17~4.6xi.386.rpm instead. In Hercules 2.2.0, Citadel
stopped providing new remedies for Red Hat Linux 6.0 and 6.1 because these versions are no
longer supported by Red Hat.
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Hercules AIX Client Requirements:
Type

AIX Components

Comments

Platforms

AIX 5.1, 5.2

Processor

PowerPC™

• Hercules Client operates at run level
2

Memory

128 MB RAM or above

Free Disk Space 15 MB in /opt for client install
2 GB for patch downloads in
/opt/citadel/hercules/down load
Security
Software

• OpenSSH v3.5p1 or higher
• SSL/HTTPS enabled with
OpenSSL
0.9.6 or higher

• Outbound access via HTTP/HTTPS
• Disk space for patch downloads
depends on size of bff or .tar.gz files to
download.

• (SSH) Inbound root access via
TCP/IP port 22
• Citadel recommends sudo access for
enhanced security

• Sudo v1.6.7 or later (optional)

Hercules HP-UX Client Requirements:
Type

HP-UX Component

Comments

Platforms

HP-UX 11.0, 11 iv1

• Hercules Client operates at run level 3

Processor

PA-RISC

™

Memory

128 MB RAM or above

Free Disk Space 15 MB in /opt for client install
1 GB for patch download in
/opt/citadel/hercules/down load
Software

Requires the following or
superseding
patches:
PHSS_28869 (for HP-UX 11.0)
PHSS_28871 (for HP-UX 11 iv1)

Security
Software

• OpenSSH v3.5p1 or higher
• SSL/HTTPS enabled with
OpenSSL
0.9.6 or higher
• Sudo v1.6.7 or later (optional)

• Outbound access via HTTP/HTTPS
• Disk space for patch downloads
depends on size of the depot files to
download.

•" Download latest patches for HPUX 11.0 and 11iv1"

• (SSH) Inbound root access via TCP/IP
port 22
• Citadel recommends sudo access for
enhanced security
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Hercules OS X Client Requirements:
Type

Mac OS X Component

Comments

Platforms

Mac OS X 10.2 (Jaguar)

• Hercules Client runs as a daemon
• Outbound access via HTTP/HTTPS

™

Processor

PowerPC

Memory

128 MB RAM or above

• Disk space for patch downloads
depends on size of the disk image (dmg)
files to download.

Free Disk Space 15 MB in /opt for client install
200 MB for patch download in
/opt/citadel/hercules/down load

Security
Software

• OpenSSH v3.6.1 p1 or higher • (SSH) Inbound root access via TCP/IP
port 22.
• SSL/HTTPS enabled with
• Citadel recommends sudo access for
OpenSSL 0.9.6 or higher
enhanced security. By default, sudo is
• Sudo v1.6.7 or later (optional)
installed with the Mac OS X.

a. This version is different than that required for the other clients.
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Shipping Information
PBO Name (Site):
PBO Telephone Number:
PBO e-mail Address:
Site Mailing Address:

Mark For (POC name):
POC Telephone Number:
Completed Shipping Checklist:
Date Shipped:
Date of Clone used:

FedEx Tracking Number (s)

Yes

No
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Additional Information
Site-specific
information and/or
comments.
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Appendix C – Network Diagram of Installation

Figure 1 Network Diagram of Installation

The network diagram above is not an actual site-specific drawing. This is just a representation of
the design used due to security concerns of actually publishing a combatant command’s network
diagram on the Internet. The number of site represented in the diagram does not reflect the actual
number of sites the SCTS was installed at for this project.
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Appendix D – Acronym Listing
ATO – Authority to Operate
AVR - Automated Vulnerability Remediation
CM - Configuration Management
CMM - Capability Maturity Model
CND – Computer Network Defense
COCOMS - Combatant Commands
CONOPS - Concept of Operations
DOD – Department of Defense
ESSG – Enterprise Solutions Steering Group
HTTP - HyperText Transfer Protocol
HTTPS - HyperText Transfer Protocol (Secure)
IA – Information Assurance
IAVM - Information Assurance Vulnerability Management
IDS - Intrusion Detection System
IIS – Internet Information Services
IP - Internet Protocol
IS - Information System
IT - Information Technology
LAN - Local Area Network
MOA - Memorandum of Agreement
MOU - Memorandum of Understanding
POC - Point of Contact
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REM - Remote Enterprise Management
SA - System Administrator
SCCVI – Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative
SCRI – Secure Configuration Remediation Initiative
SCTS - Secure Configuration Tool Suite
SEI - Software Engineering Institute
SMS - Systems Management Server
SSAA – System Security Authorization Agreement
TCP/IP - Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
VA – Vulnerability Assessment
VMS - Vulnerability Management System
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Glossary of Terms
Accountability - The property that allows the ability to identify, verifies, and traces system
entities as well as changes in status. Accountability is considered to include authenticity and
non-repudiation.
Accreditation - The formal declaration by an Accreditor that an AIS, site, application, or network
is approved to operate in a particular security mode using a prescribed set of safeguards.
Architecture - The configuration of any equipment or interconnected system or subsystems of
equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management,
movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or
information; includes computers, ancillary equipment, and services, including support services
and related resources.
Assurance - A measure of confidence that the security features and architecture of an AIS, site,
application, or network accurately mediate and enforce security policies and is composed of the
degree of availability, confidentiality, accountability, and integrity required of the AIS, site,
application, or network.
Configuration Control - Process of controlling modifications to an IT system’s hardware,
firmware, software, and documentation to ensure that the system is protected against improper
modifications prior to, during, and after system implementation.
Configuration Management (CM) - Management of security features and assurances through
control of changes made to hardware, firmware, software, documentation, test, test fixtures, and
test documentation of an automated information system throughout the development and
operational life of a system.
Designated Approving Authority (DAA) - Official with authority to formally assume
responsibility for operating an AIS, site, application, or network at an acceptable level of risk.
Developer - The organization or individual that develops the information system or application.
Environment - The aggregate of external procedures, conditions, and objects that affect the
development, operation, and maintenance of a system.
Information Security Policy - The aggregate of directives, regulations, rules, and practices that
regulate how an organization manages, protects, and distributes information. For example, the
information security policy for financial data processed on DOD systems can be contained in
public law, executive orders, DOD directives and local regulations. The information security
policy lists all the security requirements applicable to specific information.
Information System (IS) - Any telecommunication or computer-related equipment or
interconnected system or subsystems of equipment that is used in the acquisition, storage,
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manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or
reception of voice and/or data, and includes software, firmware, and hardware.
Information Technology (IT) - The hardware, firmware, and software used to perform DOD
information functions. This definition includes computers, telecommunications, automated
information systems, and automatic data processing equipment. IT includes any assembly of
computer hardware, software, and/or firmware configured to collect, create, communicate,
compute, disseminate, process, store, and/or control data or information.
Information Technology Security (ITSEC) - Protection and maintenance of confidentiality,
integrity, availability, and accountability.
Risk Assessment - Process of analyzing threats to and vulnerabilities of an IT system, and the
potential impact that the loss of information or capabilities of a system would have on national
security and using the analysis as a basis for identifying appropriate and cost-effective
countermeasures.
Risk Management - Process concerned with the identification, measurement, control, and
minimization of security risks in IT systems.
Security - Measures and controls that ensure confidentiality, integrity, availability, and
accountability of the information processed and stored by a computer.
Security Policy - The set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how sensitive or critical
information is managed, protected, distributed, and stored.
Security Requirements - Types and levels of protection necessary for equipment, data,
information, applications, and facilities to meet security policy.
Threat - The capabilities, intentions, and attack methods of adversaries to exploit, or any
circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to information or an AIS, site,
application, or network.
Validation - Determination of the correct implementation in the completed IT system with the
security requirements and approach agreed upon by the users, acquisition authority, and DAA.
Verification - The process of determining compliance of the evolving or existing IT system
specification, design, or code with the security requirements and approach agreed on by the
users, acquisition authority, and DAA.
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